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Cultural Collateral Damage:
The Cancellation of Jordan’s Jerash Festival 2006
Kate Wilson
Jerash Festival of Arts and Culture ran twenty-ﬁve times between 1981 and 
2007. The festival had been suspended twice, both times because Israel invaded 
Lebanon, ﬁrst in 1982 (the festival’s second year), and again in 2006, which would 
have been the festival’s quarter-century anniversary—an event I had traveled to 
Jordan to witness and research.1 This essay contextualizes the nonevent of Jerash 
Festival. I read the absence of this cultural event as revealing a presence of another 
kind, that is, of looming forces of international politics, especially Israeli and U.S. 
military operations, which render powerful repercussions on live entertainment 
performance, especially in the elaborate setting of festivals, and especially festivals 
in the Arab world. Borrowing a military euphemism, these effects can be considered 
“cultural collateral damage,” indirect repercussions of military violence on the 
cultural sphere. En route to those ideas, I consider Jerash in the context of festivals 
generally and describe the geopolitical landscape of Jordan, in which festivals, 
alongside other modes of public expression, do or do not happen.
What Jerash Festival Was
“Festival” is not a monolithic phenomenon, so a brief taxonomy helps to 
position Jerash amid the variety of types. First is the question of scale, in which 
Jerash would be considered one of the larger, state sponsored affairs in contrast 
to smaller, local events, as in neighborhood religious celebrations. Another broad 
distinction lies in the content, in what a festival offers. One class of content irrelevant 
to this paper is the noncultural (for instance, Dubai’s Shopping Festival). Festivals 
that do present culture can be split broadly into mixed genre or single genre (e.g., 
music, dance, ﬁlm, or theatre). Both Jordan’s Jerash and Lebanon’s Baalbakk 
[or Baalbeck or Baalbek] offer an array of music, dance, and theatre, including 
traditional or folk performances. Several Arab world festivals are dedicated solely 
to theatre, and like festivals elsewhere, these further reﬁne their focus by geography 
or subgenre. At least two specialize in theatre from the Arab or African regions: 
Syria and Tunisia alternate years presenting the former’s Damascus Theatre Festival 
and the latter’s Carthage Theatre Days (Journées Théâtrales de Carthage). Israel’s 
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Acco Festival of Alternative Israeli Theatre, which purports to include Palestinians, 
frames itself by both place (nation) and sub-genre (alternative theatre).2 Two 
Arab-world theatre festivals limit themselves to contemporary, avant-garde, or 
experimental work. In Jordan, an independent theatre company, Al-Fawanees 
(“Lanterns”), hosts the Amman Festival (the most government-independent festival 
of the region),3 and Egypt has the Cairo Experimental (Tajribi) Festival, which has 
drawn the most English-language coverage.4 Other Arab world festivals focus on 
children’s theatre, music, or dance. Marvin Carlson’s survey names many of these 
Arab-world varieties.5
A third variable involves the setting. Such festivals call attention to one speciﬁc 
location. Jerash Festival thus promoted a particular space, a compound of Roman 
ruins, for reasons I return to below. Lebanon’s Baalbakk and Tunisia’s Carthage 
Theatre Days are also set amid ruins. Festivals set in and named for large cities (e.g., 
Damascus) often aim for urban rejuvenation.6 Jordan’s recent subsuming of Jerash 
into a nationwide Jordan Festival marks a shift in the symbolic strategy of setting, 
with hopes to spread tourism across multiple sites and perhaps to highlight the 
nation in the map of world culture. A fourth variable speaks to festivals’ orientation 
to audience, as in connoisseur or general public. In geographic terms, a festival 
can target foreigners, its own country, or its region (a taxonomy Al-Hamarneh and 
Steiner use to compare the effects of Arab tourism after September 11).7 Jerash 
Festival targeted a mixture of Jordanians, Arabs across the region, and also cultural 
tourists from abroad (as its bilingual promotion suggests).
Separate festivals can be linked into a global network—not an actual 
bureaucracy, but a transnational cultural zone, called an “integrated cultural realm” 
or a “recreational geography,” as Kirshenblatt-Gimblett says of museums.8 These far 
ﬂung events are linked as a festival circuit (by artists), or a map/calendar of festivals 
(by tourists), or a map of rivals (by organizers). In Arab cultural cartography, 
Lebanon’s Baalbakk, Tunisia’s Carthage Theatre Days, and Egypt’s Cairo 
Experimental Festival are the touchstones, the region’s reference points. Jordan’s 
airline magazine article promoting the 2006 event quoted the Jerash director’s boast 
that “we cover more artistic ﬁelds” than do Baalbakk and Carthage.9 In practical 
terms, this network of festivals makes for easier touring for artists, compared to 
coordinating separate venues, and it becomes especially useful for Arab performers 
working in strained situations. Frédéric Maurin recognizes some artists’ dependence 
on such circuits for two reasons, the ﬁrst artistic,10 such as when during Jordan’s 
theatrically lean 1960s, well before Jerash, some actors commissioned an original 
play to bring to Syria’s Damascus Theatre Festival.11 Second, Maurin notes the 
obvious ﬁnancial beneﬁts of playing festivals, but like others who comment on 
the circuit he neglects a third beneﬁt, the political advantage; Palestinian artists 
constrained in self-expression and mobility, for example, can ﬁnd easier pathways 
and better exposure by touring foreign festivals (given the clout of the auspices 
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and the packaged logistics of travel).12
Jerash Festival was positioned within this circuit of festivals, or, as a 2006 
organizer boasted, “year by year it grew into the most unique and spotlighted 
festival in the Arab world.”13 But what are these phenomena? Although scholarship 
on festivals is scattered and limited—it has only begun to solidify as a book or 
conference theme—the existing writings largely reinforce one another’s grounding 
deﬁnitions. Foremost, it takes the form of an “event.” A mini-encyclopedic entry 
in Performance Research says it is an event, while StanleyWaterman says that 
festivals offer an event for consumption.14 Both glosses distinguish it as ephemeral, 
unlike an ongoing event (a re-enactment museum), a solid commodity, or a recorded 
performance (though commercial mementos and recordings are often integral to the 
event). Various commentators characterize the event by its compact assemblage: 
“a gathering of that which has been scattered” (director Peter Sellars), “condensed 
packages of associated artistic events” (Performance Research), or events in “a 
concentrated form” (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett).15 This concentration intensiﬁes the 
experience of visitor and participant—and magniﬁes the loss when cancelled. As 
the term “package” suggests, festivals, unlike riots or a lively neighborhood, are 
orchestrated and controlled (that is, not spontaneous and anarchic). For some critics, 
festivals are tamed versions of carnival. Waterman further deﬁnes the festival as 
cyclic (usually annual or biennial).16 In cancelling Jerash, this dependable regularity, 
this reinforcement of custom for attendees and workers, was ruptured, perhaps partly 
explaining why the following year’s festival in 2007 saw low turnout.
The compact, ephemeral event of Jerash Festival spanned several days in 
late July or early August, every year except for the two interruptions of the cycle 
(1982 and 2006). The festival occupied a compound of Roman ruins in Jerash, 
a smaller city an hour northward (or 48 kilometers) from the capital, Amman, a 
setting that comprised much of its appeal. The ruins are central to the promotion 
and interpretation of the festival. A perky 1984 report in a Western-oriented Arab 
magazine highlights the practical features of the site, its scale, and variety:
The sprawling, well-preserved antiquities of the large Roman 
city with its two theatres, several temples, colonnaded streets, 
oval piazza, and ample open areas permitted guests to stroll 
at their leisure through the exhibits, rest among the ruins at 
will and choose from the 10 different activities taking place 
simultaneously.
To this Jordanian journalist, the backdrop of the ancient ruins fostered sensual and 
social pleasures:
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[A]s a result, the festival took on a permanently bustling yet 
relaxed atmosphere: thousands of families strolling up and down 
the colonnaded streets, eating and drinking, enjoying an exhibit, 
listening to a music group, watching a folkloric performance, 
chatting with friends or simply sitting down on a fallen second-
century Corinthian column capital and enjoying the spectacle 
of an ancient city ablaze with lights and the sounds of tens of 
thousands of people making—and enjoying—music and art.17
The magazine description, a kind of ﬂâneur-for-families, seems to have been 
accurate, though it was probably styled to meet Western expectations of the 
experience. A few Arab acquaintances remembered from the same era not strolling 
with their families, but attending single events, such as a concert by a foreign 
political singer it would otherwise have been hard for them to hear live. The fact that 
events were ticketed separately (and some priced prohibitively) may have fostered 
some attendees’ orientation to single events. No one who spoke to me (besides the 
archeologist) invoked the ruins perhaps because, with Roman residue still standing 
in Amman, Petra, and other places around the country, residents are familiar with 
ruins—rather, it was the festival’s concentrated assemblage of cultural events that 
would have seemed notable to them.
Yet the ruins did matter: they supplied signiﬁcance as well as function and 
pleasure. Queen Noor’s foreword to the 1998 program suggests that the Jerash 
festival continues Roman rites held on the site, as the festival director had done 
in 1997. They thereby present Jordan as an extension of the supposed cradle of 
civilization: in the ancient empire, as now, the festival “made its citizens feel that 
they were truly ‘citizens of the world’.”18 This continuity model of ancient-to-recent 
festivals is echoed in Maurin’s preface to an issue of Contemporary Theatre Review 
dedicated to festivals.19 While the continuity hypothesis seems appealing, cultural 
scholars tend to agree that festivals signal modernity, speciﬁcally the modern 
nation-state, even as they feature traditional folk culture, as Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 
argues for non Arab cases.20 Festivals lend cosmopolitan cachet, or “capital,” to 
the area, even when the site is an ancient ruin, as some Jerash programs’ rhetoric 
seemed to underscore. Through festivals, the state uses the local to connect to the 
global, or rural heritage to signal the cosmopolitan.
Folklorist Torunn Selberg sees such local-global encounters optimistically as 
“a space where relations between global, national, regional, and local levels are 
discussed, negotiated, and, perhaps, redeﬁned” (at least for his case of Norway).21 
Jerash Festival did juxtapose these strata, involving workers and the mayor at the 
local level, insisting on a quota of national performers, featuring a “guest country” 
(for some years), and scheduling regional celebrities as well as lesser known 
artists from distant continents. Attendees, too, manifested some mix from local 
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Jerash townspeople, to other residents of Jordan, to other Arab visitors, to distant 
foreigners—though attendance statistics are elusive. Juxtaposition alone, however, 
does not fulﬁll Selberg’s vision of transforming those relations. The magazine 
quoted above extolled instead the experiences of “families . . . and their friends,” 
not of strangers interacting; Jerash promotion often foregrounds the opportunity 
for Jordanian artists, not attendees, to meet foreign counterparts. Whether the 
festival propagates the state’s status as modern or opens space for multi-strata social 
negotiations, and aside from the question of whether these are good effects, clearly 
its potential to do either is lost when the festival cannot happen.
Jerash Festival expanded and changed character from its early 1980s beginnings 
to the early 2000s. Originally based in only one amphitheatre, the festival presented 
mainly “folk” performances, foreign or domestic, or other forms of national 
heritage. That traditional populism continued, welcoming troupes from Zimbabwe, 
Slovakia, Palestine, Tunisia, and Poland who usually presented costumed dance 
to instrumental music.22 Jerash Festival regularly included Caucasian or Circasian 
folklore (understood as part of Jordan’s culture). An early chairperson articulated 
a deliberate emphasis on folk art as the best ambassador of foreign culture, since 
this would be “closer to the heart and tastes of the Jordanian public,”23 a vision 
quite distinct from the avant-garde aesthetics that curates folk forms into other 
festivals.24 The festival director at the same time deﬁned the ethos as “non-elitist 
and non-specialized.” This ethos did manage to encompass a wide variety:
Chinese acrobats; American bluegrass music; local rock and 
traditional Arab music; Scottish bagpipers and drummers; Arabic 
poetry readings and literary discussions; Jordanian productions 
of local plays; ﬁve different Jordanian folklore troupes and the 
Jordanian armed forces band.25
The festival’s scope makes room for rock music (if home-grown), further reaches 
of Asia (China), typical hallmarks of foreign culture (Scottish bagpipes), and 
the unusual genre of military music (which in Jordan relies on bagpipes), while 
it excluded Western classics, experimental art, and mass-media entertainment. 
The producers also delegated space for material culture, using the colonnade for 
handicraft markets (demonstrating as well as selling). Jerash has also long included 
books, but as the least discussed feature of the festival, it is not clear how these 
cultural products ﬁt the overall curatorial vision—that is, whether books too were 
mainly local, Arabic, or traditional.
This vision shifted as ongoing archeological excavation expanded the site,26 
creating more room for events, and as the mission changed. After explicitly 
eschewing “more sophisticated art forms such as symphony orchestras or 
Shakespearean drama”27 in 1984, the festival later presented both.28 By 1997, 
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the program had expanded two ways, toward Western high-brow (e.g., baroque 
orchestras), and commercial pop music and DJ-ing. It was the latter, the slide toward 
mass-media entertainment, that provoked complaints the festival had declined, 
a criticism I heard in professional circles. The U.S.-educated director from the 
late 1990s onward, Jeryes Samawi, who was simultaneously Minister of Culture, 
internationalized the poetry symposium beyond Arab writers and welcomed the 
ballet Swan Lake, changes he reported with visible pride during our interview and in 
press coverage.29 Though Samawi designed and curated programming, he like any 
festival director had to align his vision with the wishes of others, perhaps especially 
the Queen and Princess who sat on the board; presumably the tide turned at all levels 
of festival administration. Yet, this backroom decision making and whatever debates 
it entailed remain obscure. As it incorporated elite and commercial entertainment, 
the late 1990s slate did not abandon Arab arts—Samawi established a formal 
celebration of one Arab music instrument each year.30 The domestic emphasis on 
the earlier vision—“above all, to provide a showcase for Jordanian artists”—was 
not fully erased, as the organizers upheld a quota of Jordanian participation, but the 
contour of the festival had been drastically redrawn. Thus, while in the early 1980s 
the promotional discourse located the festival’s value in honoring traditional forms, 
by 2006 it celebrated a diverse spectrum of forms—high, popular, or folk. In the 
early years the festival deﬁned itself by type of culture, that is, folk in contrast to 
“elitist or Western arts,”31 yet two decades later it deﬁned itself by cultural event, 
that is, broad in contrast to narrow festival programming.
Besides Shakespeare, how did theatre ﬁt into Jerash? Modern drama had 
some presence in the festival. Even the mid-1980s inventory includes “Jordanian 
productions of local plays,” and programs from the early 2000s list lesser known 
Jordanian plays, several of which I note below. The festival also presented better 
known Arabic playwrights, as when Alfred Faraj’s (Farag) The Good and the Bad 
took the main stage in 1998. Besides these and the many shows aimed at children, 
however, theatre occupied a smaller proportion than did music, singing, and dance.32 
It is hard to fathom, then, why the 2005 festival committee chose as a tagline the 
metaphorical phrase “Jerash Festival: Theatre to the World.” It may have been 
some brahmin’s pet idea; it may have been designed to promote theatre as a viable 
genre within Jordan (which does seem valued in children’s and students’ culture); 
or to use “theatre” to mean a portal, a window onto world culture for Jordanians; 
or quite differently, to position Jerash as a major node within the global network 
of cultural events, a cornucopia of culture for worldwide visitors. Such taglines 
appear only on recent programs and posters; forewords appeared in earlier programs 
but then disappeared.
To understand the stature of drama in Jordanian culture, it helps to take a brief 
detour over the landscape of Jordan’s theatrical performances outside the festival. 
There are certainly glimmerings of theatre. Both its public university campuses, 
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Yarmouk and Amman, house active theatre departments; that summer I saw the 
construction sites of new theatres on the Amman campus, and the department chair 
described large developments in theatre studies there, encouraged by the royal 
family.33 The avant-garde Amman Festival happens in the fall, as it did in 2006 
(though the Al-Fawanees group leaves a regrettably slim print trail in English).34 
Other ostensibly independent but more mainstream organizations, notably the 
Queen Noor Foundation, run theatre, dance, and visual arts programs for children. 
Besides receiving foreign visiting shows, occasionally Amman generates its own 
large productions (buttressed by foreign funding), such as the nineteenth-century 
German opera Abu Hassan that was slated to re-appear at Jerash Festival in 2006. 
A regional innovation appears annually in the form of “Ramadan theatre,” dinner 
theatre for Muslims breaking their daytime fast.35
Yet when the hostess of a gathering asked what I had come to study, and I 
answered “theatre,” she exclaimed with amusement, “here?!” Jordan has not forged 
a thick performance culture, relative to nearby Syria, Lebanon, or Egypt, as even 
upbeat reports have to admit. Celebrating UNESCO’s designation of Amman as 
2002 “Cultural Capital of the Arab World,” a glossy oil company cultural magazine 
described Jordan’s “serious” theatre as merely “building for the future,” rather 
than as currently thriving.36 Ghassan Al-Haddad’s Ph.D. dissertation centers on 
explaining why Jordan has not developed a thriving theatre, a failure he attributes 
less to politics (besides a cryptic reference to the ﬁrst Gulf War) than to Arab 
misunderstanding of Western drama theory in combination with cultural restraints 
on women, gender mixing, and emotional display.37 More prominent Arabic theatre 
scholars diagnose obstacles to Arabic drama more regionally and historically, 
pointing to the challenges inherent in the language, that is, the forced choice between 
local or standard idiom.38 A fuller explanation of Jordan’s performance problems, 
which remains to be articulated in English, would need to integrate an array of 
factors: its small population of ﬁve million; its colonial history, which imposed 
British social and cultural forms, including ﬁlm and radio on a nomadic society 
that had not established its own dramatic theatre culture (though, paradoxically, 
television regularly airs live plays and so perpetuates a popular dramatic canon); 
its suppression of communist and socialist movements, which sometimes fostered 
conditions amenable to theatre; the lack of artists’ unions or a national theatre; 
the lack of an independent arts council; and perhaps, as elsewhere, the effects of 
globalized media and corporate sponsorship. Jerash Festival arose as an antidote 
to this undeniable shortage. An earlier chairperson, Leila Sharaf, quoted in the 
glossy oil company magazine, invoked this very deﬁciency to highlight the value 
of the festival: “[T]he long years of stagnation of arts in Jordan’s modern history, 
coupled with Jordan’s lack of a strong historical artistic tradition such as existed in 
Damascus, Cairo or Baghdad, mean we need something to breathe some life into 
the culture and arts,” that something being Jerash Festival.39
100                                                             Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism
The layout of the festival was a constellation of unequal parts. The event spread 
across the elaborate compound of ruins, with lights rigged atop columns, crafts 
sold from stone stalls that had been Roman empire shops, and spectacles appearing 
in the hippodrome (a plaza encircled by columns). The large amphitheatre called 
South Theatre, seating thousands, presented the headline shows, like the region’s 
pop singers, ranging from leftist Marcel Khalifeh, octogenarian Wadi Saﬁ, to the 
light MTV-style of Nancy (all from Lebanon); these charged the highest ticket 
prices (up to 15JD, roughly $21, but organizers promised a 12JD cap, $17, for 
2006).40 Some interlocutors recalled that, as university students in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, they could not afford the celebrity concerts (about $25). Classical 
and national folk shows also used the large theatre, though for cheaper tickets. 
A mid-sized amphitheatre, restored ﬁfteen years after the festival began, staged 
large but not blockbuster shows, as for example in 2005 a marimba soloist and the 
Pakistani “Suﬁ-rock” group, Jounoun (costing around 5JD, or $7). The Artemis 
temple (sometimes written “Artimes”), furnished for performance, held three 
children’s plays and a local one-man play, The Joker, that same year. As the festival 
expanded to other sites and the capital, some of the scripted drama was routed to 
the state theatre in Amman, as were two dramatic monologues of historical ﬁgures, 
the poet Gibran Khilal Bibran (2004), and a sultana, Shajarat Al-Durr (2005). All 
these venues sat dark after the cancellation in 2006.41
Although I classiﬁed Jerash as one of the large-scale, state-run festivals, in 
fact it drew little funding directly from the state, and therefore could describe 
itself as independent, or nongovernmental, a distinction from most Arab-world 
cultural festivals, which are state sponsored.42 Its funding came from an eclectic 
assortment of contributors: the domestic cement industry, French tourist agencies, 
and once Coca-Cola, then Pepsi. Yet it might be more accurately considered quasi-
governmental. The oft-repeated history roots itself in Queen Noor’s collaboration 
with the nearby state university, Yarmouk, in 1981, soon after the school had 
established the country’s ﬁrst department of theatre. I heard competing accounts 
of the origins. Whatever its genesis, Queen Noor headed the festival’s ﬁrst 
Higher Committee,43 her voice frames earlier brochures, royal portraits decorate 
programs, and the organizational board has continually included ministers and 
other royal family members. National television (JRTC) both sponsored and aired 
the events. The festival’s security and transportation were supplied by the military 
(as a Jordanian activist informed me). Its volunteer guides were recruited from the 
national university; two Yarmouk alumni who self-identify as leftist remembered 
the festival as a mainstream, pro-monarchy affair, and students who joined the 
volunteer staff as naïve or politically conservative. Also, the festival must interact 
with the national Department of Antiquities, which manages the archeological site 
year-round, albeit in negotiations archeologists described as tense—a rare sign of 
internal conﬂict associated with the government.
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Studying Jerash Festival, 2006
My fieldwork project aimed to gauge how Jerash Festival manifested 
the tensions—local/global, culture/commerce, authority/people—that such 
“concentrated packages” embody in the context of a particular Arab nation. 
Although Jerash Festival seemed to lend itself to cultural analysis along several 
lines of thought, it had not yet been studied (in English). Granted, from business-
oriented ﬁelds come mentions of techniques like a “Tourism Impact Attitude Scale” 
measuring “attitude items” of Jerash attendees,44 but humanities and critical social 
science scholars have not discussed the festival, except in inventories of national 
or Arabic arts. Even the longest English-language monograph on theatre in Jordan, 
Al-Haddad’s dissertation, does not cover the country’s festivals. In general, 
Arab-world festivals receive less attention than do either festivals elsewhere or 
other aspects of Arabic culture, notably the exotic (Islamic performance) or the 
accessible (translated novels). Besides Marvin Carlson’s panoramic survey of 
Arab-world festivals, the few performance writings to address them fall in the 
genre of review, as Edward Ziter reports on Syria’s Damascus Festival, distinct 
from an essay analysis of the entire phenomenon.45 One of the thickest analyses 
of a festival emerges from Middle East studies, in Christopher Stone’s critical 
history of Lebanon’s Baalbakk festival, which reconstructs the ideological process 
of the festival committee’s choices, though his larger focus is one music family.46 
In general, the weak interaction between Middle East studies and performance or 
theatre studies leaves Arab festivals rather neglected in scholarship, a gap I had 
hoped my project would help to bridge.
In 2006, funded by a modest grant,47 I spent the summer in Jordan, framing 
my visit with the international Middle East studies conference in Amman at the 
beginning, and the Jerash Festival at the ﬁnale. During ﬁeldwork intended to 
expose me to theatre, I passed weeks without seeing live performance. The World 
Congress for Middle Eastern Studies presented other entertainments in several 
cultural venues, but no theatre (which was scarcely represented in daytime panels 
as well). For a New Yorker accustomed to relying on print and digital data, like 
calendars or phone books, I found it challenging to locate information about events 
in Amman, which more often ﬂows through informal, human channels, for reasons 
largely related to the economics of stafﬁng and printing rather than to a different 
orality/text relationship; newspapers and magazines, after all, are abundant and 
ubiquitous, and the radio is not as favored as in similar countries. On the other 
hand, my reliance on printed matter for navigation (maps), a reliance not shared 
by most Jordanians, probably does point to certain differences in print culture. I 
forwent “Race: The Roman Army and Chariot Experience,” a touristic spectacle 
of Roman gladiators operated by a European entrepreneur; I missed the itinerant 
circus that camped for a while on a ﬁeld alongside the thoroughfare; and I never 
got hold of the program for municipal events scheduled in Amman’s downtown 
102                                                             Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism
Roman theatre. The proliﬁc comic actor Nabil Sawalha, who straddles theatre and 
television and ventures political criticism on stage, was not then performing; his 
once home-base theatre sat dusty and closed near what the residents call Rainbow 
Street (though maps say otherwise).
I did attend what may have been the only locally running play, a low-budget 
“social comedy” called “O, Good People, for God’s Sake [Give]” (Lillah ya 
muhsineen), meaning roughly “Please, Sir, can you spare a dime.” Staged in 
a conventional proscenium theatre in downtown Amman, the play followed a 
family from a life of Three-Penny-Opera-style begging to their mishaps running 
a nightclub, sprinkled with jokes about Jordan’s economy, malapropisms, a satire 
of oral poetry, a performance-in-a-performance (lip-syncing a pop song), and a 
buffoonish ethnic role (desert Bedouin) who turns out to be a government spy. The 
actors seemed on par with comic actors anywhere, far outshining the low-budget sets 
and a loosely cobbled playscript. Otherwise, awaiting the festival, I absorbed daily 
life in the capital, observing the broader cultural patterns in streets, markets, and a 
few arts venues, acclimating myself to the ubiquitous portraits of King Abdullah, 
visible on every shop wall, and the lack of criticism of him anywhere. I witnessed 
how World Cup soccer captivated attention, watched on televisions in homes and 
shops, but also in public plazas, where crowds of men gathered to watch outdoor 
screenings at the state’s expense because most people could not afford the cable 
service that monopolized coverage of the games.
In July, the workaday normality of Amman lurched when new violence erupted 
nearby: the Israeli battle against Hezbollah in Lebanon.48 Though Jordan seems 
to sally forth alongside the ongoing Palestinian occupation and even the Iraq war 
(both abutting its borders), the relentless images of bombed buildings and civilian 
casualties in southern Lebanon caused a drastic shift in public mood. Television 
sets in shops and homes stayed tuned-in to gruesome coverage of the war, as earlier 
these had unfailingly shown World Cup matches. I heard rumors that ofﬁcials might 
cancel Jerash Festival, given the sobriety of the moment. Days before the festival’s 
start date, the clerk renewing my visa conﬁrmed the rumor. The same clerk, in a 
sardonic suggestion that I should complain to my government, expressed rather 
directly the sense many Jordanians harbored more quietly: that U.S. support (by 
material weapons and political justiﬁcations) enabled the Israeli attack on Lebanon, 
which in turn forced the cancellation of the festival. From a theatre perspective, 
the U.S. fostered cultural collateral damage, or conditions in which Jerash Festival 
could not happen. My ﬁeldwork went with it.
Studying Jerash Festival Cancelled
With the festival cancelled, I confronted a basic point about any analysis of a 
cultural production: the event has to happen. Writings about festivals often take for 
granted that no war, inﬂux of refugees, or mass outcry has stopped the event from 
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happening, from being attended by me or another tourist. Yet when a cultural event 
does not happen because it had to be cancelled, something else does happen—an 
event of a different kind, cultural collateral damage wreaked by violent political 
forces that loom over the region. This negative is worth analyzing in the context 
of theatre, albeit not by the methods of conventional dramatic criticism.
How can we think about a nonhappening? There is no corpus of writings about 
nonexisting events or cultural collateral damage. Scholarship on Palestinian theatre 
recognizes a deliberate and direct policy of violence on culture, but this mode 
of targeted assault should be distinguished from the more indirect, “collateral” 
effects I describe here. Writers who encountered cancelling or absence elsewhere 
mention them as a mere passing moment of ﬁeldwork.49 Within the recent anthology 
on Middle East culture, Colors of Enchantment, Deborah Kapchan narrates her 
disappointment when, funded by a Fulbright fellowship to study Moroccan theatre, 
she found the main venue closed—not due to violence, but the innocuous purpose 
of renovation; she then pivoted to another site, engaged another genre, and thus 
centers her article on the political themes inhering in the very happening of poetry in 
Morocco.50 In Kapchan’s ﬁeldwork, the political lay in the events she ultimately did 
witness, the practices and events that happened; in my ﬁeldwork, the political lay in 
the canceling, the nonhappening, of the very event I had come to witness. Instead of 
interpreting the political connotations in a single show in the festival, or of reading 
the full gamut of the festival as a signal of the state’s self-image, I read the absence 
of them as a symbol of political violence. The very complexity of festivals that 
renders them useful for artists, consumers, and scholars reﬂects a scale—in terms 
of physical space, numbers of bodies, and quantities of monies involved—that also 
renders them sensitive to political events, especially violence, even when it happens 
far from the site. A large-scale, cyclical event requires conditions that are unﬁt for 
war. Festivals require what other parts of the tourism industry require: “political 
stability, peace, security, and the potential for intercultural dialogue” free from 
mental or physical obstruction.51 Military operations also generate other material 
repercussions, as mass violence interrupts the ﬂows of goods, routes public funds 
to military and security expenses, and for other reasons strains national ﬁnances. 
Volatility frightens off donors and investors, not only for concerns about proﬁt, 
but for nuances of political resonances.
To understand the nonevent of Jerash Festival, the first step requires 
constructing a context, starting with a history. Indeed, the canceling of the 2006 
Jerash Festival due to large-scale violence was hardly new. Other festivals have 
similarly broken their cycles for reasons related to U.S. policy in the Middle East. 
First, Syria’s Damascus festival paused during the 1990s due to repercussions 
from the ﬁrst U.S. Gulf War.52 Second, Jerash had been cancelled once before, 
in 1982, also because of an Israeli siege of Beirut (enabled, as Israeli operations 
are, by U.S. support). But even two cancellations of Jerash are overshadowed by 
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the mother of festival cancellations, the long suspension of Lebanon’s Baalbakk 
festival from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s, during and after the country’s civil 
war, (called “civil” though deeply embroiled with Israel’s occupation of Palestine 
as well as interventions by the U.S.). Baalbakk, the ﬁrst Arab festival set amid 
Roman ruins, had run for twenty years and enjoyed wide prestige, so its absence 
resonated powerfully.
Complicating any simple history of cultural collateral damage, we come 
across the fact that violent conﬂict has at times given rise to a festival wherein 
culture emerges as a byproduct—not a victim—of war. For example, Lebanon’s 
civil war left a cultural vacuum in the region, making room and cause for Jerash 
Festival to come into being.53 Also, in response to Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, 
the Egyptian government cancelled events, but deﬁant artists launched the Free 
Theatre Festival, arguing that art should happen precisely during conﬂict.54 More 
directly still, Lebanon’s other large event, the Beiteddine Festival, supposedly came 
into being as a response to Lebanon’s civil war, founded by a politician as “a call 
for normality amidst the chaos and madness of war,” according to its promotional 
material.55
Beiteddine does not ﬁt the deﬁnitions of festival glossed above, since it strings 
a series of one-off events across several weeks. In summer 2006, therefore, the 
early segment of the festival happened as planned (Ricky Martin), but the later 
segments coincided with the Israeli bombings, and so were cancelled (Liza Minnelli 
and Stomp!). Beiteddine’s mountain palace entertainment, established as respite 
from one war, became too vulnerable to another war to happen. Here I turn from 
historical context to lateral, contemporaneous context, an atlas of nonevents. The 
Jerash cancellation happened amid a veritable community of cancellations that 
summer. The region’s entire cultural zone fell within the climate of war, even in 
sites at a safe remove from the battles. Baalbakk was unlucky again for its position 
inside Israel’s bombing range. In North Africa, Tunisia halted its Carthage Theatre 
Days. Celebrity singers cancelled concerts or suffered criticism in the press for going 
ahead with them. There is no systematic inventory of these repercussions, though, 
and it is difﬁcult to assemble written records in English. Another repercussion of 
mass violence is in fact this loss of cultural history, as collateral damage often 
smudges its own trail. Beiteddine’s promotion, for example, provides precise dates 
and names for other years, but left enigmatic silence about the 2006 fallout, which 
I learned about only through a Washington Post column.56
As in the scholarship on festivals that happen, it seems useful to distinguish 
between types of festival cancellations. The main division separates the direct from 
indirect causality. Some of these events, that is, were cancelled for immediate, 
practical necessity, the threat of harm to bodies and the real destruction of sites. 
But not all the 2006 cancellations happened for practical or material necessity. 
Jerash, Carthage, and several pop music concerts sat a safe distance away from 
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the violence. These cancellations involved choice, if not in the primary conditions, 
then in the reaction to those conditions. These agents choose a kind of damage 
(cancelling events), perhaps some self-damage, in response to larger damage. Here 
my reading of the nonevent becomes more complex; in semiotic literary terms, the 
symbol is not a transparent vehicle for its referent, not a natural or straightforward 
reﬂection, as in, say, a naïve undergraduate’s interpretation of drama as literally 
representing real events. It is not an index of violence, or an index of responses to 
violence. When cancellation becomes a message, it becomes a mediation, involving 
selection of some kind of language—even if here the code turns out to be silence. 
Interpreting that silence requires understanding of Jordan’s geopolitics.
Public Political Expression in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
The cancelling of the festival happened in the complicated context of a West-
friendly Arab nation. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, a small, dehydrated 
country, enters U.S. news mainly for being surrounded by neighboring conﬂicts 
(Israel/Palestine, Iraq, and Syria), or for having a former monarch, Queen Noor, 
who was a United States citizen; it itself has hardly seen war. Yet the country 
is deeply embedded in the troubles at its borders, which have delivered several 
inﬂuxes of Palestinian and Iraqi refugees, besides other interactions driven by trade, 
political alliances, and the need for foreign water. Ruled by Anglophone royalty, 
since the 1990s Jordan has operated under an “open-door” neo-liberal economic 
policy: transnational corporations increasingly pervade domestic commerce, or in 
pedestrian terms, American fast-food franchises crop up all over. As anywhere else, 
“liberal” economic policy does not automatically activate liberal social rights—
Jordan grants no free speech protection to insults to the monarchs, for instance. 
(I heard no critical comments about the king, not even from artists, progressives, 
or intellectuals.) The point deserves mention when pro-globalization arguments 
hastily conﬂate liberal economics with social liberalism or free markets with 
freedom. Jordan also stands out for its government’s accommodating agreements 
with Israel, a departure from the majority of both the Arab League as well as its own 
population.57 The government’s acquiescence to U.S. preferences over the desires 
of its own citizens gives rise to strong tensions internally, from both secular and 
Islamic corners, tensions that are increasingly contained by state regulation and, 
consequently, self-censorship.
With the onset of war, however, the Jordanian public demanded a mass, somber 
reaction, an implicit criticism of the Israeli assault on Lebanon. The mode of 
reaction, appropriate to the moment, precluded the “festivity” inherent in festival 
(the Arabic term has an analogous sense of joyous gathering: muharjaan). In casual 
conversation, a Palestinian undergraduate in Jordan commented, “I can’t shake my 
hips to [pop singer] Nancy when Lebanon is being destroyed.”58 The public, from 
what I sensed, did not want Jerash Festival to go forward. The specter of Israel 
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bombarding Lebanon—crystallized in the macabre slaughter of ﬂeeing civilians,59 
reﬂected in U.S. rationalizations, and reiterated through all media channels—stoked 
an apparently communal reaction among Arabs, a readiness to make or interpret 
charged symbols. The monarchs, parliament, and quasi-governmental Jerash 
Festival committee were forced to accommodate the widespread mood and cancelled 
the festival at a sizable economic loss. Meanwhile they had to ﬁnesse their responses 
to avoid disrupting friendly relations with Israel or the U.S. Squeezed into this 
complicated position, the Jerash Festival website referred to tragedy in Lebanon, 
and perhaps mentioned Palestine, without mentioning Israel (that webpage has 
since vanished).60 In striking contrast, at Syria’s theatre festival, the minister of 
culture “announced that Syria and all Arabs of the theatre were united in the struggle 
against Israel and in their support of the Iraqi insurgence.”61
What is the symbolic process of the festival, or its negation? Peter Sellars’s 
description of festivals invokes a carnivalesque quality: “It is a moment in which 
the world is turned upside down.”62 Wittingly or not, he invokes a particular sense 
of carnival advanced by Soviet literary critic Mikhail Bakhtin as “of the people” 
in contrast to culture presented “for the people” as in a festival; this carnival 
channels a countercultural spirit expressed through parody and by upending 
status-quo categories.63 But what happens when the world already seems upended? 
When President Bush blamed Syria for Israel’s bombing and Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice called the spectacle of dead Lebanese “birth pangs,” from the 
perspective of those close to the war, the symbolic modes that scholars attribute to 
carnival—ironic reversal, grotesque exaggeration, travesty, or the absurd—already 
surrounded them in real world events. Seen from close up, things clearly looked 
absurd. Carnival can be interpreted either in the romantic sense of subversive public 
expression, 64 or more cynically as a regulated pressure-valve that allows the people 
momentary subversions, like cross-dressing or mocking authority, as it preempts 
their outright rebellion.65 Whichever the interpretation, however, carnival is another 
large public function sponsored by a larger political body, as are festivals. In Jordan, 
the gesture of canceling operates at this general level, where carnival is analogous to 
other large orchestrated gatherings. It works as a kind of inversing the happening of 
carnival, not an inversing through carnival, that is, by carnivalesque modes. Rather 
than people enjoying an event the authorities sponsor for them, the people pressure 
the authorities to shut it down. In 2001, during the Palestinian uprising, the festival 
went forth, but public pressure had shaped the festival programming to themes of 
Arab solidarity;66 now not even artistic solidarity seemed appropriate. According to 
the festival director, as the board made the decision through an emergency meeting 
(minus Queen Noor) and telephone conversation, it encountered little opposition 
or debate.67 Read optimistically, collective self-silence functions as a kind of voice, 
and cultural nonexistence can express the desire to exist in a different way. The 
public in this case crossed national borders in a temporary revival of pan-Arab 
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nationalism—a sensibility shared across separate Arab nation-states before 1967.
Although in Jordan I witnessed no dissent from this counter-festive silencing, 
Egypt saw a more complicated reaction to cultural decision making. Egypt’s 
cultural complexity relative to Jordan is predictable, given its larger, older, and 
more layered cultural infrastructure, including several festivals and an active 
independent theatre scene. After the war began, the Egyptian Ministry of Culture 
did run its own state-sponsored event, but tried to cancel another series run by 
independent (non-governmental) auspices. According to the sardonic journalist 
Nehad Selahia, the state designated these “weaker independent groups” as “the 
cheapest sacriﬁcial offering” to the expectations in the region.68 Though delayed, 
the independent artists eventually opened their series, which included a company 
from Jordan.69 To these artists, canceling did not represent collective mourning, 
but rather state domination and hypocrisy. Even this exception reﬂects the fact that 
cultural happenings across the region felt the impact of the war, in that the terms of 
the debate were informed by the conﬂict. Selaiha endorsed the artists’ canceling-
the-cancellation as a productive reaction to the war, not as a festivity carried out 
despite, or oblivious to, or as escape from, the horror.
How then did people in Jordan express their political responses? Perhaps not as 
an American might expect. Some Jordanians, pitying my loss of ﬁeldwork, arranged 
for a personal tour of the ruins, a compensation prize. The site was quiet; nothing 
marked the cancellation except a half-constructed restaurant tucked in the side of 
an amphitheatre. For a moment I wondered why the canceling of the festival did 
not become a synecdoche of outrage, why the site of the would-have-been festival 
did not serve as a symbol of mourning and protest (with, say, placards associating 
the Roman empire with U.S. imperialism). Most obviously, the ruins sit by a 
minor town too far from the capital for impromptu collective action. Also, Jordan’s 
Roman ruins hardly matter to local concerns beyond their functions in tourism, as 
decoration on money, or as a place to lean while smoking a cigarette. Perhaps the 
Jerash Festival as a whole matters less to the public than organizers or outsiders 
believe. But no other sites or symbols were adopted to express outrage over the 
war, for a more forceful reason: Jordanians are now banned from demonstrating 
in public. In the 1990s, Jordanians had manifested dissent over policies related 
to the U.S. and Israel, especially those related to Israel’s occupation of Palestine 
and U.S. interference in the Middle East, both political and economic.70 When 
the government does grant permits for demonstrations, their routes are steered 
to symbolically irrelevant spaces.71 And at some level, the government permits 
these outcries over foreign affairs in order to preempt rebellion over domestic 
problems,72 something like the more cynical gloss of the carnival as a pressure-
valve. Even such constrained expressions diminished when, following the second 
Palestinian intifada, the ascent of the new king, and the events of September 11th, 
the Jordanian parliament and palace “imposed comprehensive bans on public 
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demonstrations, arrested activists opposed to normalization with Israel, and issued 
two new temporary laws that signiﬁed the government’s unwillingness to tolerate 
organized public dissent or make any compromises with the political opposition.”73 
As a scholar of Jordanian protests puts it, “The most basic political freedoms have 
fallen as casualties while the government pursues the objective of close relations 
with the US.” Though favored by the U.S. mainstream press, Jordan, the Arab 
country whose recent “crackdowns on free expression have been most dramatic,” 
is “far less liberal than its reputation” in the West suggests.74 Indeed, that summer 
the authorities blocked a union demonstration against the war.
With political public outcry so squelched, the summer of 2006 saw few 
instances of live mass expression, or conscientious gathering, not counting 
shopping or the half-block “Luna” amusement park. Before the Israeli bombing, 
Italy’s ﬁnal victory over France in the World Cup provoked a boisterous effusion 
of loud sidewalk crowds, honking cars, and undulating Italian ﬂags75—the only 
spontaneous, wild, street-side outcry I witnessed in those two months. Perhaps, 
as companions suggested, the outcry sublimated political frustration in relation to 
Iraq or other geopolitics, but, if so, it was a male-only sublimation, and one that 
revealed nary a hint of Middle East affairs. I also witnessed two orderly outdoor 
gatherings: the inauguration of Amman’s ﬁrst public park (with Jordanian poetry 
readings and a French photography exhibit); and the “Global Village,” an open-
air fairgrounds of separate nations’ “pavilions” (temporary shops for a country’s 
typical export commodities), screened by a ticket booth and metal detector. But 
sports, a city park, and an outdoor market were not occasions for direct political 
expression.
As the bombing continued, a middle-class crowd did manage to assemble 
in response to the war. They did not march by the parliament or demonstrate 
before the U.S. or Israeli embassies, where crowds would have been prohibited,76 
but instead gathered outside the darkened Lebanese embassy, set on a hilltop in 
an elite neighborhood. They did not gather during a weekday, but at the end of 
Jordan’s work week (Thursday) and at night. The genre of political performance 
was a vigil or memorial, with quiet hints of a rally. If there was no protest at the 
festival, nor was there festivity in the protest (as in theatricalized demonstrations 
familiar within U.S. activism).77 Attendees stood holding the ecumenical symbol of 
mourning, candles; they chanted and sang as a group, or chatted on the side. Young 
women sold t-shirts printed with graphics and slogans about Lebanon. But for a few 
explicit chants and placards, the protest expressed sympathy more than antipathy; 
or it could be understood as covert protest only by insiders able to read the coded 
allusions and subtexts in their choice of song (as my Arab companion could do). 
Later in mid-August, according to a Jordanian blog,78 authorities sponsored “Peace 
Arts,” a cultural event through which people could channel their reactions to not 
only Lebanon, but also Iraq and Palestine, stipulating that they do so peacefully. 
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Public and outdoors, in the recently opened King Hussein Park, the event was 
obviously colored by the “decorum” Kirshenblatt-Gimblett sees as squelching 
public cultural events.79
The most visible political performance I witnessed during my stay was a march 
of university students inside their gated campus, where such displays remain legal. 
These marchers expressed political outrage in familiar student-protest idioms, 
though reformulated through Islamic codes: the phalanx of women following the 
cadre of men, modest dress all around, a raised index ﬁnger indicating one, that is, 
Allah (not “workers of the world”), and chants that invoked the war together with 
religion (not “the people, united,…”). Arriving at the edge of campus, the marchers 
faced off against the city police, who stood poised on the other side of the tall campus 
gates. The young Muslims presented the boldest anti-authoritarian attitude I saw 
displayed in Jordan, albeit one driven by another authoritarianism. Paradoxically, 
the force behind this exercise in free speech is conservative Islam—the political 
theology decried by neoliberal Americans who purport to want open, democratic, 
civil society across the Middle East. What Western pundits often fail to realize, 
though, is that the movement is modern: the surge of Islamic theologies is not 
a medieval continuity, but rather a direct effect of Reagan-era U.S. and Israeli 
funding of Muslim groups (against communism), and a direct response to the 
interferences of the U.S. and Israel in the region.80 While modern, these theocratic 
movements, like Israeli bombings, have not been conducive to Arabic theatre or 
cultural festivals.
Jerash Festival 2006 might have presented images disturbing to religious 
conservatives, such as a coed public gathering in a “bustling yet relaxed 
atmosphere.”81 It would have made room, that is, for the phenomena Western 
pundits interpret as signs of open society modernity. As illustrated by my 
experience of attending a nonexisting festival in Jordan, U.S. actions engender 
the very conditions that choke the free, democratic civil society its policies claim 
to cultivate, the conditions that would foster cultural festivals, theatre, and free 
cultural expression—happenings that in turn foster civil society. The double edge 
of U.S. policy is uncannily manifest in the writings of a single journalist, Judith 
Miller, who for decades covered the Middle East for The New York Times. In 1985, 
early in the Lebanese civil war, Miller praised the Jerash Festival for “defying Arab 
sectarianism and regional strife”;82 almost two decades later, she used her columns 
and ostensible expertise to promote the U.S. invasion of Iraq.
Admittedly, Jerash Festival was not a panacea for Jordanian culture. Like other 
state-sponsored “public relations” festivals, it likely beneﬁted elites and tourists 
more than local culture or economies.83 Even with those limitations, though, the 
twenty-four cycles of compact, orchestrated culture at Jerash did contribute doses 
of cultural activity to Jordan, where, as even its own promotion admits, there is 
not a rich landscape of performing culture. When the authorities diluted it into 
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a sprawling national affair, the decision disgruntled local artists.84 Like other 
large festivals, it created spaces of potential for interaction, making meaning, 
and perhaps small-scale resistance. It would have brought more performance to 
Jordan, circulated cash among local merchants, hired tech crews, allowed Jordan 
performers to present their work and witness other work, televised programs to 
reach a broader audience, and left a record of Arab-world artistic activity. These 
became part of that war’s cultural collateral damage.
By highlighting this single ﬂow of causality, I do not mean to suggest that the 
repercussions of violence and economic inequity unfold simply, to predictable and 
monolithic effects; nor that all Arabs in the region share one identical reaction; 
and certainly not that all obstacles to theatre in the Arab world originate in U.S. 
and Israeli actions. But many of the oft-invoked problems, like state censorship or 
the intensiﬁcation of Islam, can be seen as entwined with these powerful forces, if 
one pans out from the view that isolates Arab problems from international politics 
or modern history, and if one considers the larger conditions required for cultural 
production. By treating a non event as an event, I hope to shift the critical gaze to 
causes besides the usual suspects (the lack of indigenous theatre, the proscriptions 
of Islam, government corruption, censorship, and Arab gender conventions). These 
variables get exposure in academic writing, journalism, and political discourse, and 
even in Arabic drama itself.85 In the larger view, international military conﬂict, in 
conjunction with global economics, wreaks cultural collateral damage, especially 
in the Arab Middle East, and especially for such large scale events as festivals.
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